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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, soon after its adoption by the American Bar
Association,' the Arkansas Supreme Court 2 adopted the
Code of Judicial Conduct. 3 The Code has not been generally available in Arkansas. An easily accessible version of
the Code is needed in view of the expansion of the judiciary,
the original Arkansas options, the broadcasting revision, 5 a6
1982 modification in the judicial campaign requirements,
and a developing body of case law on the disqualification of
judges under the Code.
For the Arkansas version that appears in this issue of
the Law Review, I have omitted from the official ABA version the financial interests section that was rejected by the
Arkansas Supreme Court and inserted the 1980 and 1982
amendments. To improve readibility, I have removed the
Commentary 7 that is interspersed in the text of the Code and
set it out as footnote material.
$ Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkasnsas.
1. For the background to the adoption of the Code by the American Bar Association, see Armstrong, The Code of Judicial Conduct, 26 Sw. L. J. 708 (1972). The
fourteen member committee that drafted the Code included the late Edward L.
Wright of Little Rock and Dr. Robert A. Leflar of the University of Arkansas.
2. The interest of the Arkansas Supreme Court in judicial ethics is not recent.
In 1962, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court requested an advisory opinion as
to the necessity for automatically disqualifying himself from every case in which a
member of his former law firm appeared before the court. American Bar Association
Informal Decision 594, October 22, 1962.
3. Per Curiam Order of November 5, 1973, 255 Ark. 1075, 493 S.W.2d 422
(Appendix).
4. See note 17 to Canon 5(C)(2) infra.
5. Petition of Arkansas Bar Association, Per Curiam Order of December 8,
1980, 271 Ark. 358, 609 S.W.2d 28; Per Curiam Order of the Arkansas Supreme
Court, March 8, 1982, - Ark. -, - S.W.2d -.
6. In re The Code of Judicial Conduct, 274 Ark. 581, 627 S.W.2d 1 (1982).
7. The Court has referred to the Commentary in several cases: e.g., Edmonson
v. Farris, 263 Ark. 505, SW.2d 617 (1978); Farley v. Jester, 257 Ark. 686, 520 S.W.2d
200 (1975).
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In its order, the Supreme Court did not officially adopt
the Code and supersede the prior Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Instead, it declared that the Code constituted "proper standards for the Judiciary of this State."9 Since the Arkansas
Constitution gives power to the General Assembly to discipline judges through the impeachment process, one judge
dissented, wondering whether the Code was to be a guide to
judicial conduct or a rule. 10 Despite that concern, and despite occasional mistaken references to the prior Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 1 the Arkansas Supreme Court has treated
the Code as a binding rule.' 2 Similarly, the Court, in its
adoption of the Code, did not specifically supersede statutes
governing judicial conduct,' 3 although its power to do so
seems clear.14 The subsequent cases have applied the Code
rather than the relevant statutes still on the books. 15 In at
8. The Canons of Judicial Ethics are printed at 6 ARK. L. REV. 412-17 (1952).
9. Per Curiam Order of November 5, 1973, supra, note 3.
10. 255 Ark. at 1075 (Byrd, J., dissenting).
11. See Petition of the Arkansas Bar Association, 263 Ark. 948 (July 17, 1978)
(incorrect reference to the Canons of Judicial Ethics); In re: Amendments to the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, 267 Ark. 1181,
590 S.W.2d 2 (1979).
12. See Farley v. Jester, 257 Ark. 686, 694, 520 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1975) ("the
Code of Judicial Court . . .adopted by this court. . . .") (emphasis added). The
Preface to the Code indicates that it was to be more than merely guideline. "In the
judgment of the Association this Code, consisting of statements of norms denominated canons, the accompanying text setting forth specific rules, and the commentary,
states the standards that judges should observe. The canons and text establish
mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated."
13. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1106 (Repl. 1976) (judge shall not participate in
any political campaign except his own); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-113 (Repl. 1962) (judicial disqualification).
14. The separation of powers doctrine is enshrined in the Arkansas Constitution,
ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2, preventing the legislative or executive branch from exercising
power over the judiciary. In addition, the supreme court has a general superintending
control over all inferior courts. ARK. CONST., art. 7, § 4. Therefore, except for the
constitutionally authorized legislative power of impeachment, ARK. CONST., art. 15,
§ 1, discipline of judges involving less than removal from office should rest with the
Supreme Court. See the authorities in Comment, Removal and Discilineof Judges in
Arkansas, 32 ARK. L. REv. 545, 552 n.56 & 559 n.88 (1978). See generally, Cameron, The Inherent Power of a State's Highest Court to Discipline the Judiciary, 54
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45 (1977).
15. Braswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 567 S.W.2d 113 (1978). Some cases, however, decided since the adoption of the Code have ignored the Code provision on
disqualification and looked only to the statute. See Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 579
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least one
instance, the statute appears stricter than the
6
Code.'

By its terms, the Code applies to appellate and trial
court judges, to full-time judges, as well as to part-time17
judges, special judges and retired judges in some aspects.
It governs conduct of the judge on and off the bench, in his
professional and personal affairs. The Code requires
financial reporting, mandatory disqualification in some instances and limited political activity.' 8 The Code does not
provide any guidelines or procedures for action against
judges, nor does it suggest or prescribe sanctions. The existing statutory mechanism for discipline of judges is of limited utility.' 9
S.W.2d 91 (1978); Baker v. Odom, 258 Ark. 826, 529 S.W.2d 138 (1975). VanHook v.
VanHook, 270 Ark. 27, 603 S.W.2d 434 (Ark. App. 1980).
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-113 (Repl. 1962), implementing ARK. CONST. art. 7,
§ 20, disqualifies a judge who is related within thefourth degree of consanguinity. In
contrast, the Code disqualifies a judge related within the third degree of consanguinity. See Canon (3)(c)(l)(d), infra.
17. The statutory grounds for disqualification of a federal judge are contained in
28 U.S.C. § 445 (1976), which was amended in 1974 to conform generally with the
Code of Judicial Conduct. See Harley v. Oliver, 400 F. Supp. 105, 109 (W.D. Ark.
1975). See Note, Disqualocation of Federal Judgesfor Bias Under 28 U.S. C. Section
144 andRevised Section 445, 45 FORD L. REV. 139 (1976). A recent case involving the
recusal of an Arkansas federal judge is Marshall v. Georgia Pacific, 484 F. Supp. 629
(E.D. Ark. 1980). Justice Rehnquist defended his controversial participation in Larid
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) in a lengthy memorandum. 409 U.S. 824 (1972). Federal
judges may seek adivsory opinions on ethical questions from the Advisory Committee
on Judicial Activities. See King, JudicialActivities and Ethics, 75 F.R.D. 107 (1976).
The financial disclosure requirement is stricter for federal judges than for state judges.
See 28 U.S.C. App. § 301; Deplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979)
(constitutionality of statute affirmed, as substantially furthering important governmental interests).
18. A comprehensive symposium on the Code of Judicial Conduct is in 1972
UTAH L. REV. 333-47. See generally Thode, The Code ofJudicial Conduct-The First
Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 395.
19. The Judicial Ethics Committee is authorized to investigate alleged violations
of judicial ethics by judges of the Supreme Court, circuit courts, chancery courts and
municipal courts and to report to the General Assembly. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-1001
et. seq. (Supp. 1981). The Judicial Qualifications Commission examines alleged ethical violations by inferior court judges. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-144-145 (Supp. 1981).
The procedural and constitutional flaws in both statutes are thoroughly explored in
Comment, Removal and Discipline ofJudges in Arkansas, 32 ARK. L. REV. 545, 551-58
(1978). The ABA Standards Relating to Judicial discipline and Disability Retirement
have not been adopted in Arkansas. Id. at 558-69. See generally, Judicial Discpline
and Disability Symposium, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1-23 8 (1977).
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The decisions from the Arkansas Supreme Court primarily involve the necessity for disqualification under Canon 3
of the Code. The judge is to avoid not only all impropriety,
but also any appearance of impropriety.20 Court proceedings must not only appear to be fair and impartial for the
litigants, 'but must maintain public confidence in the
judiciary.21
Even absent a motion or an objection by a party, a
judge who falls within the scope of Canon 3(C) is to disqualify himself.22 The court is to take the initiative if the litigant
or his attorney does not. If the objection is not raised at the
trial court level, it may be raised initially on appeal, even sua
sponte.23 Canon 3(C) applies to both criminal and civil
cases, and is applicable at the arraignment stage of a criminal proceeding. 24 Canon 3(D) provides an alternative to disqualification if the parties agree independently in writing to
the judge's continuation in the litigation.25
20. Farley v. Jester, 257 Ark. 686, 520 S.W.2d 200 (1975).
21. Oliver v. State, 268 Ark. 579, 594 S.W.2d 261 (Ark. App. 1980).
22. Jordan v. State, 274 Ark. 572, 626 S.W.2d 947 (1982) (not improper for judge
to preside over criminal case when, as prosecuting attorney, he had actively prosecuted the defendant in three prior felony convictions; Brasswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706,
567 S.W.2d 113 (1978) (judge was the father-in-law of an attorney); Edmonson v.
Farris, 263 Ark. 505, 565 S.W.2d 617 (1978) (judge was the father of an attorney).
23. Adams v. State, 269 Ark. 548, 601 S.W.2d 881 (1980) (judge was the uncle of
the prosecuting attorney).
24. Id.
25. Id.; Edmonson v. Farris, 263 Ark. 505, 565 S.W.2d 617 (1978).
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CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY
An independent and honorable judiciary is midispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in
establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself
observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
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CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL HIS ACTIVITIES
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law
and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other
relationships to influence his judicial conduct or
judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his
office to advance the private interests of others; nor
should he convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a
character witness.'
1. Author's Note: Unless otherwise indicated, these footnotes are the Commentary that accompanies the American Bar Association's version of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct
by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. He
must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept
restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
The testimony of a judge as a character witness injects the prestige of his office
into the proceeding in which he testifies and may be misunderstood to be an official
testimonial. This Canon, however, does not afford him a privilege against testifying
in response to an official summons.
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CANON 3

A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF
HIS OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND
DILIGENTLY
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all
his other activities. His judicial duties include all the duties
of his office prescribed by law. In the performance of these
duties, the following standards apply:
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it. He
should be unswayed by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum
in proceedings before him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar
conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and
control.2
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is
legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law,
and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider exparte or other communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain
the advice of a disinterested expert on the law
applicable to a proceeding before him if he
gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to
2. The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent
with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Courts can be efficient
and business-like while being patient and deliberate.
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respond. 3

(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of court.4
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment
about a pending or impending proceeding in
any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to
his direction and control. This subsection
does not prohibit judges from making public
statements in the course of their official duties
or from explaining for public information the
procedures of the court.5
(7) A judge may authorize broadcasting, recording, or photographing in the courtroom and
areas immediately adjacent thereto during
sessions of court, recesses between sessions,
and on other occasions, provided that:
(a) the participants will not be distracted nor
will the dignity of the proceedings be
impaired;
(b) an objection timely made by a party or
attorney shall preclude broadcasting, recording, or photographing of the proceedings; and, an objection timely made
by a witness who has been informed of
the right to refuse such exposure, shall
3. The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes
communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted. It does not preclude a
judge from consulting with their judges, or with court personnel whose function is to
aid the judge in carrying out his adjudicative responsibilities.
An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the advice of
a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite him to file a brief amicus curiae.
4. Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to his duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to insist that court officials, litigants and their
lawyers cooperate with him to that end.
5. Author's Note: "Court personnel" does not include the lawyers in a proceeding before a judge. The conduct of lawyers is governed by DR7-107 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. See Robinson, The Arkansas Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 33 Aax. L. REV. 605 (1980).
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preclude broadcasting, recording or
photographing of that witness.
(c) the broadcasting, recording or
photographing of any court proceeding
will be in compliance with the rules
adopted by the Arkansas Supreme
Court;
(d) trials in juvenile court or concerning
adoptions, guardianships and domestic
relations shall not be subject to broadcasting, recording or photographing.6
B. Administrative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration,
and facilitate the performance of the adminis6. Author's Note: The rule allowing broadcasting of courtroom proceedings
was adopted as an experiment for 1981, Petition of Arkansas Bar Association, 271
Ark. 358, 609 S.W.2d 28 (1980), and slightly modified after committee review. Per
Curiam Order of the Supreme Court, March 8, 1982, - Ark. -, - S.W.2d -. The
per curiam orders promulgated guidelines and created a committee to monitor and
review the experiment. The prior language in the Code was:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may
authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the perpetuation of a
record, or for other purposes of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive,
ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recordings and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the
dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or
recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the
recording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding
has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted;
and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes
in educational institutions.
Commentary: Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential to the
fair administration ofjustice. The recording and reproduction of a proceeding should not distort or dramatize the proceeding.
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trative responsibilities of other judges and
court officials.
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence
that apply to him.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may become aware.7
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should exercise his power of
appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He should not
approve compensation of appointees beyond
the fair value of services rendered.8
C. Disqualification
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or
the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;9
7. Disciplinary measures may include reporting a lawyer's misconduct to an
appropriate disciplinary body.
8. Appointees of the judge include officials such as referees, commissioners,
special masters, receivers, guardians and personnel such as clerks, secretaries, and
bailiffs. Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does
not relieve the judge of the obligation prescribed by this subsection.
9. A lawyer in a governmental agency does not necessarily have an association
with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of this subsection; a
judge formerly employed by a governental agency, however, should disqualify him-
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(c) he knows that he, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or
in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding:
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the
third degree or relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person;
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding; 0
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to
be a material witness in the
proceeding;
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and
make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal financial interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his
household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated
according to the civil law system;I'
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships
self in a proceeding if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of
such asociation.
10. The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which
a lawyer-relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge.
Under appropriate circumstances, the fact that "his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" under Canon 3C(l), or that the lawyer-relative is known by the judge to
have an interest in the law firm that could be "substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding" under Canon 3C(l)(d)(iii) may require his disqualification.
11. According to the civil law system, the third degree of relationship test would,
for example, disqualify the judge if his or his spouse's father, grandfather, uncle,
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as executor, administrator, trustee, and
guardian;
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a
legal or equitable interest, however
small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or common
investment fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" in
such securities unless the judge
participates in the management of
the fund;
(ii) an office in an educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by
the organization;
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy
holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual
savings association, or a similar
proprietary interest, is a "financial
interest" in the organization only if
the outcome of the proceeding
could substantially affect the value
of the interest;
of government securities
ownership
(iv)
is a "financial interest" in the issuer
only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the
value of the securities.
D. Remittal of Disqualification.
A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon
3C(1)(c) or Canon 3C(l)(d) may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his disqualification. If, based on
brother or niece's husband were a party or lawyer in the proceeding, but would not
disqualify him if a cousin were a party or lawyer in the proceeding.
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such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's relationship is immaterial or
that his financial interest is insubstantial, the judge
is no longer disqualified, and may participate in
the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall 2be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.'
12. This procedure is designed to minimize the chance that a party or lawyer will
feel coerced into an agreement. When a party is not immediately available, the judge
without violating this section may proceed on the written assurance of the lawyer that
his party's consent will be subsequently filed.
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CANON 4
A JUDGE MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES TO
IMPROVE THE LAW, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM, AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to
decide impartially any issue that may come before him:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate
in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice, and he may otherwise
consult with an executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning the administration of justice.
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of
an organization or governmental agency devoted to
the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration ofjustice. He may assist such an organization in raising funds and may participate in
their management and investment, but should not
personally participate in public fund raising activities. He may make recommendations to public and
private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice.' 3
13. As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a
unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and
improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that his time permits, he
is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial
conference, or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law. Extrajudicial activities are governed by Canon 5.
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CANON 5
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE
THE RISK OF CONFLICT
WITH HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES

A. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture,
teach, and speak on non-legal subjects, and engage
in the arts, sports, and other social and recreational
activities, if such avocational activities do not detract from the dignity of his office or interfere with
the performance of his judicial duties. 14
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities that do not
reflect adversely upon his impartiality or interfere
with the performance of his judicial duties. A
judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or
non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted for the economic or political advantage of
its members, subject to the following limitations:
(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the
organization will be engaged in proceedings
that would ordinarily come before him or will
in adversary proceedings
be regularly engaged
15
in any court.
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization, or use or permit the use of
the prestige of his office for that purpose, but
he may be listed as an officer, director, or
trustee of such an organization. He should
14. Complete separation of a judge from extra-judicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not become isolated from the society in which he lives.
15. The changing nature of some organizations and of their relationship to the
law makes it necessary for a judge regularly to reexamine the activities of each organization with which he is affiliated to determine if it is proper for him to continue his
relationship with it. For example, in many jurisdictions charitable hospitals are now
more frequently in court than in the past. Similarly, the boards of some legal aid
organizations now make policy decisions that may have political significance or imply
commitment to causes that may come before the courts for adjudication.
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not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an
organization's fund raising events, but he may
attend such events.
(3) A judge should not give investment advice to
such an organization, but he may serve on its
board of directors or trustees even though it
has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.'
C. Financial Activities.
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and
business dealings that tend to reflect adversely
on his impartiality, interfere with the proper
performance of his judicial duties, exploit his
judicial position, or involve him in frequent
transactions with lawyers or persons likely to
come before the court on which he serves.
(2) Subject to the requirement of subsection (1), a
judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity
including the operation of a
17
business.

(3) A judge should manage his investments and
other financial interests to minimize the
number of cases in which he is disqualified.
As soon as he can do so without serious
financial detriment, he should divest himself
16. A judge's participation in an organization devoted to quasi-judicial activities
is governed by Canon 4.
17. Author's Note: The American Bar Association offered an option to the
states. The version adopted by Arkansas was for jurisdictions "that do not provide
adequate judicial salaries but are willing to allow full-time judges to supplement their
incomes through commercial activities . . . until such time as adequate salaries are
provided. .... "

The ABA further suggested that such jurisdictions might also "wish to prohibit a
judge from engaging in certain types of businesses such as that of banks, public utilities, insurance companies, and other businesses affected with a public interest." The
Arkansas Supreme Court did not adopt any regulation or rule along those lines. The
suggested language for jurisdictions with adequate judicial salaries is: "Subject to the
requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold and manage investments, including
real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity, but should not serve as an
officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business."
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of investments and other financial interests
that might require frequent disqualification.
(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his family
residing in his household should accept a gift,
bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as
follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a
public testimonial to him; books supplied
by publishers on a complimentary basis
for official use; or an invitation to the
judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function or activity devoted to the
improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest,
favor, or loan from a relative; a wedding
or engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of
business on the same terms generally
available to persons who are not judges;
or a scholarship or fellowship awarded
on the same terms applied to other
applicants;
(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept any
other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if
the donor is not a party or other person
whose interests have come or are likely to
come before him, and, if its value exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the
same manner as he reports compensation
in Canon 6C.18
(5) For the purposes of this section "member of
his family residing in his household" means
any relative of a judge by blood or marriage,
18. This subsection does not apply to contributions to a judge's campaign for
judicial office, a matter governed by Canon 7.
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or a person treated by a judge as a member of
his family, who resides in his household.
(6) A judge is not required by this Code to disclose his income, debts, or investments, except
as provided in this Canon and Canons 3 and
6.19

(7) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not be used or disclosed
by him in financial dealings or for any other
purpose not related to his judicial duties.
D. Fiduciary Activities. A judge should not serve as
the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or
other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of his family, and then only if
such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Member of his
family" includes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with
whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to
the following restrictions:
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a
fiduciary he will be engaged in proceedings
that would ordinarily come before him, or if
the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in
adversary proceedings in the court on which
he serves or one under its appellate
jurisdiction.20
(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is subject
19. Canon 3 requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which he
has a financial interest, however small; Canon 5 requires a judge to refrain from engaging in business and from financial activities that might interfere with the impartial
performance of his judicial duties; Canon 6 requires him to report all compensation
he receives for activities outside his judicial office. A judge has the rights of an ordinary citizen, including the right to privacy of his financial affairs, except to the extent
that limitations thereon are required to safeguard the proper performance of his duties. Owning and receiving income from investments do not as such affect the performance of a judge's duties.
20. The Effective Date of Compliance provision of this Code qualifies this subsection with regard to a judge who is an executor, administrator, trustee, or other
fiduciary at the time this Code becomes effective.
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to the same restrictions on financial activities
that apply to him in his personal capacity.2 1
E. Arbitration. A judge should not act as an arbitrator or mediator.
F. Practice of Law. A judge should not practice law.
G. Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not
accept appointment to a governmental committee,
commission, or other position that is concerned
with issues of fact or policy on matters other than
the improvement of the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice. A judge, however,
may represent his country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical,
educational, and cultural activities.22
21. A judge's obligation under this Canon and his obligation as a fiduciary may
come into conflict. For example, a judge should resign as trustee if it would result in
detriment to the trust to divest it of holdings whose retention would place the judge in
violation of Canon 5C(3).
22. Valuable services have been rendered in the past to the states and the nation
by judges appointed by the executive to undertake important extra-judicial assignments. The appropriateness of conferring these assignments on judges must be reassessed, however, in light of the demands on judicial manpower created by today's
crowded dockets and the need to protect the courts from involvement in extra-judicial
matters that may prove to be controversial. Judges should not be expected or permitted to accept governmental appointments that could interfere with the effectiveness
and independence of the judiciary.
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CANON 6
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULARLY FILE
REPORTS OF COMPENSATION
RECEIVED FOR QUASIJUDICIAL AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES

A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement
of expenses for the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities
permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments does
not give the appearance of influencing the judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety,
subject to the following restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a
reasonable amount nor should it exceed what a
person who is not a judge would receive for the
same activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement
should be limited to the actual cost of travel, food,
and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and,
where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse.
Any payment in excess of such an amount is
compensation.
C. Public Reports. A judge should report the date,
place, and nature of any activity for which he received compensation, and the name of the payor
and the amount of compensation so received.
Compensation or income of a spouse attributed to
the judge by operation of a community property
law is not extra-judicial compensation to the judge.
His report should be made at least annually and
should be filed as a public document in the office of
the clerk of the court on which he serves or other
office designated by rule of court.23
23. Author's Note: The Supreme Court directed that the annual reports be filed
during June with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Per Curiam Order of November 5,
1973, 255 Ark. 1075, 493 S.W.2d 422 (Appendix).
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CANON 7
A JUDGE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
INAPPROPRIATE TO HIS
JUDICIAL OFFICE
A.

Political Conduct in General.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial
office should not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a
political organization;
(b) make speeches for a political organizaendorse a
tion or candidate or publicly
24
candidate for public office;
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or
make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or purchase tickets for political
party dinners, or other functions, except
as authorized in subsection A(2);
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as
permitted by law, attend political gatherings,
speak to such gatherings on his own behalf
when he is a candidate for election or re-election, identify himself as a member of a political party and contribute to a political party or
organization.
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either in a party primary or
in a general election for a non-judicial office,
except that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a candidate for election
to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional convention, if he is otherwise permitted
by law to do so.

24. A candidate does not publicly endorse another candidate for public office by
having his name on the same ticket.
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(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to
improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.
B. Campaign Conduct
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge,
for a judicial office that is filled either by public election between competing candidates or
on the basis of a merit system election:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate
to judicial office, and should encourage
members of his family to adhere to the
same standards of political conduct that
apply to him;
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direction or control
from doing for him what he is prohibited
from doing under this Canon; and except
to the extent authorized under subsection
B(2) or B(3), he should not allow any
other person to do for him what he is
prohibited from doing under this Canon;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties
of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present
position, or other fact.
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge,
for a judicial office that is filed by public election between competing candidates should not
himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or
solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to
secure and manage the expenditure of funds
for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such
committees are not prohibited from soliciting
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campaign contributions and public support
from lawyers. A candidate's committees may
solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than
[180] days before a primary election and no
later than [180] days after the last election in
which he participates during the election year.
A candidate should not use or permit the use
of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or members of his family.25
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election to office without a
competing candidate, and whose candidacy
has drawn active opposition, may campaign in
response thereto and may obtain publicly
stated support and campaign funds in the
manner provided in subsection B(2).
25. Unless the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate.
Author's Note: Recognizing that no definite time limit had been originally to
govern committee solictation of funds for a judicial candidate, the Court adopted the
180-day limitation. Funds received prior to the 180-day period should be returned to
the contributor. Funds received personally by a judicial candidate are to be promptly
turned over to the committee. Per Curiam Order of the Arkansas Supreme Court,
January 18, 1982, 274 Ark. 581, - S.W.2d -.
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COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT

Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a
judicial system performing judicial functions, including an
officer such as a referee in bankruptcy, special master, court
commissioner, or magistrate, is a judge for the purpose of
this Code. All judges should comply with this Code except
as provided below.
A. Part-time Judge. A part-time judge is a judge who
serves on a continuing or periodic basis, but is permitted by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and whose compensation for
that reason is less than that of a full-time judge. A
part-time judge:
(1) is not required to comply with Canon 5C(2),
D, E, F, and G, and Canon 6C;
(2) should not practice law in the court on which
he serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court on which he
serves, or act as a layer in a proceeding in
which he has served as a judge or in any other
proceeding related thereto.
B. Judge Pro Tempore. A judgepro tempore is a person who is appointed to act temporarily as a judge.
(1) While acting as such, a judge pro tempore is
not required to comply with Canon
5C(2),(3),D, E, F, and G, and Canon 6C.
(2) A person who has been a judge pro tempore
should not act as a lawyer in a proceeding in
which he has served as a judge or in any other
proceeding related thereto.
C. Retired Judge. A retired judge who receives the
same compensation as a full-time judge on the
court from which he retired and is eligible for recall to judicial service should comply with all the
provisions of this Code except Canon 5G, but he
should refrain from judicial service during the period of an extra-judicial appointment not sanctioned by Canon 5G. All other retired judges

1981]

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

271

eligible for recall to judicial service should comply
with the provisions of this Code governing parttime judges.
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EFFECTIVE DATE OF COMPLIANCE
A person to whom this Code becomes applicable should
arrange his affairs as soon as possible to comply with it. If,
however, the demands on his time and the possibility of conflicts of interest are not substantial, a person who holds judicial office on the date of this Code becomes effective may:
(a) continue to act as an officer, director, or
non-legal advisor of a family business;
(b) continue to act as an executor,
administrator, trustee, or other fiduciary
for the estate or person of one who is not
a member of his family.

